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ABSTRACT 
  Congress imposed a fiduciary duty regarding compensation on 
investment advisors by adding Section 36(b) to the Investment 
Company Act of 1940. Legislators intended this fiduciary duty to 
protect mutual fund investors from excessive management fees. It has 
failed. Mutual fund investors continue to pay significantly higher fees 
than institutional investors for the same money management services. 
In Jones v. Harris Associates, decided in 2008, the Seventh Circuit 
broke with the widely followed, thirty-year-old precedent of 
Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management. Chief Judge 
Easterbrook authored the majority opinion and Judge Posner wrote 
vigorously in dissent. This disagreement between two titans of the law 
and economics community highlighted the uncertainty surrounding 
the appropriate fiduciary duty standard for mutual fund excessive fee 
cases. To address that uncertainty, the Supreme Court will hear Harris 
Associates in November 2009. This Note argues that neither the 
traditional Gartenberg standard nor the market-based Harris 
Associates standard adequately protects investors. To further 
Congress’s goal, the Court should modify, but maintain, the 
Gartenberg standard. This Note’s proposed modification—allowing 
comparisons to institutional investors’ fees and eliminating 
profitability penalties—incorporates market forces into the fiduciary 
duty standard by introducing a proxy for fairness and encouraging 
efficiency, but rejects Harris Associates’ total reliance on the market. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The mutual fund industry is indeed the world’s largest skimming 
operation, a . . . trough from which fund managers, brokers and 
other insiders are steadily siphoning off an excessive slice of the 
Nation’s household, college and retirement savings. 
– Senator Peter Fitzgerald (R-IL)1 
 A penny saved is a penny earned—minus fees. Many Americans2 
save their pennies, and dollars,3 in mutual funds.4 Even though the 
average fund performs worse than the market,5 investors continue 
paying billions of dollars in fees to fund managers each year.6 The 
level of these fees varies widely,7 but is not based on the fund’s 
 
 1. Oversight Hearing on Mutual Funds: Hidden Fees, Misgovernance and Other Practices 
that Harm Investors Before the Subcomm. on Financial Management, the Budget, and 
International Security of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 3 (2004) (opening 
statement of Sen. Fitzgerald), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi? 
dbname=108_senate_hearings&docid=f:92686.pdf. 
 2. Almost 90 million American households have assets in mutual funds. INV. CO. INST., 
2008 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 8 (48th ed.). 
 3. In November 2008, the United States’ mutual fund industry managed nearly $9.35 
trillion. Inv. Co. Inst., Trends in Mutual Fund Investing: November 2008 (2008), 
http://www.ici.org/stats/mf/arctrends/trends_11_08.html. At the end of 2007, the mutual fund 
industry had over $12 trillion under management according to the industry trade group. INV. 
CO. INST., supra note 2, at 20. The value of mutual fund holdings, however, declined sharply, 
along with the rest of the market, due to the 2008 credit crisis. See generally The Joint Economic 
Committee Majority Staff, From Wall Street to Main Street: Understanding How the Credit Crisis 
Affects You (2008), available at http://jec.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&File 
Store_id=b2087603-5883-4777-b13e-6b30845d4265 (describing the causes and effects of the 
credit crisis). 
 4. Mutual funds are a type of investment company. Investment companies include mutual 
funds, closed-end funds, and unit investment trusts (UITs). See INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 9 
fig.1.1 (aggregating the assets of mutual funds, closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds, and 
UITs as investment company assets). 
 5. Burton G. Malkiel, Are Markets Efficient?—Yes, Even if They Make Errors, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 28, 2000 (“Over the past three-year, five-year and 10-year periods, more than 75% of 
active [mutual fund] managers underperformed index funds when both are measured after 
expenses. Those that do outperform in one period are not typically the ones who outperform in 
the next.”); Susan Woodward, Make Mutual Funds Bare All!, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2004, at A10. 
 6. In 2007, investors paid more than $100 billion in mutual fund costs. JOHN C. BOGLE, 
ENOUGH 44 (2009). 
 7. See PETER J. WALLISON & ROBERT E. LITAN, COMPETITIVE EQUITY: A BETTER WAY 
TO ORGANIZE MUTUAL FUNDS 9 (2007) (“[T]he expense ratios of the 811 [actively managed 
U.S. equity] funds range[d] from approximately 60 basis points to 170 basis points, or a 
difference in cost of almost 300 percent.”). 
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performance.8 Whether the fund advisor grows investors’ money or 
loses it, the investors pay the advisor a constant percentage of their 
assets. Perhaps counterintuitively, the more a fund costs, the less it 
returns to investors.9 That is, paying a higher price does not buy a 
better return—but 84 percent of investors believe just the opposite.10 
This misperception transfers wealth from Main Street to Wall Street: 
from 1995 to 2005, a $1 investment in the average mutual fund in the 
lowest-cost quartile grew by $2.07, but in the highest-cost quartile, 
that same $1 investment only grew by $1.18.11 Fees accounted for that 
89 percent growth difference. Those fees went directly from 
Americans’ savings to investment companies’ bottom lines. 
The industry contends that its fees are set in a competitive and 
efficient market,12 but industry critics disagree.13 Regardless of the 
efficiency, or inefficiency, of the mutual fund market, Congress has 
acted to protect shareholders from excessive management fees. In 
1970, Congress imposed a fiduciary duty regarding compensation on 
investment advisors by adding Section 36(b) to the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (ICA).14 
 
 8. Fees are based on the amount of assets under management. Donald C. Langevoort, 
Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested 
Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 1017, 1020 (2005). 
 9. JOHN C. BOGLE, THE LITTLE BOOK OF COMMON SENSE INVESTING: THE ONLY WAY 
TO GUARANTEE YOUR FAIR SHARE OF STOCK MARKET RETURNS 155 (2007) (“Most 
comparisons of fund costs rely solely on reported expense ratios, and uniformly find that higher 
costs are associated with lower returns.”). 
 10. Neil Weinberg, Fund Manager Knows Best, FORBES, Oct. 14, 2002, at 208. 
 11. JOHN C. BOGLE, THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL OF CAPITALISM 162 tbl.7.1 (2005). 
 12. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV & R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund 
Industry: Evidence and Implications for Policy, 33 J. CORP. L. 151, 163 (2007) (“[T]he mutual 
fund industry’s market structure is consistent with competition providing strong constraints on 
advisory fees.”); Inv. Co. Inst., Key Issues: Fees and Expenses, http://www.ici.org/issues/fee/ 
index.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2009) (“Investors continue to benefit from intense competition 
in the financial services industry. In the investment company industry, this vibrant competition 
has produced substantially lower costs along with an array of innovative investment products 
and services that make saving and investing simpler, more accessible, and more affordable.”). 
 13. See, e.g., WALLISON & LITAN, supra note 7, at 8–13 (“[T]here is strong evidence that 
the mutual fund industry is not as price competitive as its structure would suggest. . . . [T]he 
prices . . . are not converging toward a common level, although convergence would be expected 
in a competitive market.”); John P. Freeman, The Mutual Fund Distribution Expense Mess, 32 
IOWA J. CORP. L. 739, 741 n.8 (2007) (“Through its practice of taking funding directly from fund 
shareholders, while advocating the interests of shareholders’ adversaries when it comes to 
controversies over fund fees and expenses, the ICI epitomizes the conflicted, self-serving 
structure of the money management industry it purports to represent.”). 
 14. Investment Company Act § 36(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006) (“For the purposes of 
this subsection, the investment advisor of a registered investment company shall be deemed to 
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In practice, this fiduciary duty has failed. Retail mutual fund 
clients continue to pay investment advisors substantially higher fees 
than institutional clients.15 Yet no court has ever found that an 
investment advisor breached its fiduciary duty to shareholders. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has never brought suit 
against an investment advisor for breach of fiduciary duty regarding 
fees,16 and shareholders have lost every suit they have brought.17 
When shareholders sue an investment advisor for charging 
excessive fees, the shareholders have the burden of proving the 
breach of a fiduciary duty.18 To carry this burden, shareholders have 
traditionally had to meet a multipronged test outlined in the seminal 
case Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management.19 In May 2008, in 
Jones v. Harris Associates,20 the Seventh Circuit disapproved the 
Gartenberg standard, creating a circuit split.21 In an opinion authored 
by Chief Judge Easterbrook, the court expressed skepticism about 
Gartenberg “because it relies too little on the markets.”22 In a biting 
dissent from the denial of rehearing,23 Judge Posner charged that the 
 
have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of 
a material nature, paid by such registered investment company, or by the security holders 
thereof, to such investment advisor or any affiliated person of such investment advisor.”). 
 15. See infra note 230. Institutional clients are also referred to as separately managed 
accounts. 
 16. See Richard M. Phillips, Jeffrey B. Maletta & Mark D. Perlow, Seventh Circuit Rejects 
Gartenberg but Not Business Judgment, K&L GATES, June 12, 2008, http://www.klgates.com/ 
newsstand/Detail.aspx?publication=4613 (“The SEC has express statutory authority to bring 
Section 36(b) cases, although it has not done so.”). 
 17. See James D. Cox & John W. Payne, Mutual Fund Expense Disclosures: A Behavioral 
Perspective, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 907, 914, 923 (2005) (“Plaintiffs are still seeking to achieve their 
first victory under section 36(b).”); John P. Freeman, Stewart L. Brown & Steve Pomerantz, 
Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: New Evidence and a Fair Fiduciary Duty Test, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 
83, 126 (2008) (“[N]o plaintiff has ever won a fee case brought under section 36(b).”); Lyman 
Johnson, A Fresh Look at Director “Independence”: Mutual Fund Fee Litigation and 
Gartenberg at Twenty-Five, 61 VAND. L. REV. 497, 519 (2008) (“The most remarkable statistic 
under section 36(b) is that, thirty-seven years after its enactment and twenty-five years after 
Gartenberg, no investor has obtained a verdict against an investment advisor.”). 
 18. Investment Company Act § 36(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(1). 
 19. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 20. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 21. Id. at 632 (noting the Fourth Circuit followed Gartenberg). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Judge Posner dissented from the denial of en banc review. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 537 
F.3d 728, 729 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). He did 
not sit on the panel that heard Harris Associates. In addition to the Chief Judge, the panel was 
composed of Judges Kanne and Evans. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d at 627. In his dissent, Judge 
Posner criticized the panel for its failure to “circulate its opinion to the full court in advance of 
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panel decision was primarily based on “economic analysis that is ripe 
for reexamination.”24 This disagreement between two titans of the law 
and economics community highlighted the uncertainty surrounding 
the appropriate fiduciary duty standard for mutual fund excessive fee 
cases. In March 2009, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Harris 
Associates to address that uncertainty.25 
This Note examines the controversy surrounding the fiduciary 
duty standard applied in excessive fee cases and concludes that 
neither the traditional Gartenberg standard nor the market-based 
Harris Associates standard adequately protects shareholders against 
excessive fees as Congress intended. To further Congress’s goals, this 
Note proposes that the Court should modify, but maintain, the 
Gartenberg standard. This proposed modification incorporates 
market forces into the fiduciary duty standard by introducing a 
fairness proxy and by encouraging efficiency, but ultimately rejects 
Harris Associates’ total reliance on the market. 
The Note proceeds in four Parts. Part I discusses the structure 
and fees of mutual funds. Part II describes both the traditional 
Gartenberg standard and the market-based Harris Associates 
standard. Part III presents criticisms of the Gartenberg standard but 
maintains that the framework remains useful. It continues with an 
analysis of the Easterbrook opinion in Harris Associates. This analysis 
demonstrates that, although Chief Judge Easterbrook’s opinion 
tracks his view of corporate law, he ignores the realities of the mutual 
fund market and engages in unauthorized statutory sunsetting of 
Section 36(b).26 
Finally, Part IV proposes a solution to the controversy 
surrounding the fiduciary duty standard applied in excessive fee cases. 
Gartenberg should stand, with two modifications. First, Gartenberg’s 
comparative fee structure factor must be broadened to include a 
comparison between the fees charged to captive mutual fund 
 
publication, as is required when a panel creates a circuit split.” Harris Assocs., 537 F.3d at 732 
(Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). This is not the first time Judges 
Easterbrook and Posner have been on opposite sides of a case exploring the bounds of a 
fiduciary duty. Judge Easterbrook wrote the majority opinion in Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 
815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987), with Judge Posner dissenting. 
 24. Harris Assocs., 537 F.3d at 729 (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 25. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 129 S. Ct. 1579 (2009). 
 26. See infra note 184 and accompanying text. 
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investors27 and those charged to independent institutional investors.28 
This change would allow boards and courts to compare the fee paid 
by the mutual fund shareholders to a fee negotiated at arm’s length—
a proxy for fairness. Second, Gartenberg’s profitability factor should 
be eliminated. One investment advisor should not be punished for 
being more profitable than another if that profit comes from 
efficiency and not increased fees. 
I.  THE UNIQUE STRUCTURE OF MUTUAL FUNDS 
AND ITS EFFECT ON FEES 
The mutual fund industry’s critics point to an inherent conflict of 
interest regarding fees between investment advisors and shareholders 
due to the unique structure of mutual funds.29 This Part describes that 
unconventional structure, and then explains mutual fund fees and 
their relation to the structure. It concludes by introducing the 
fiduciary duty that Congress imposed as a solution to the widely 
recognized conflict of interest. 
A. The Structure of Mutual Funds 
Mutual funds are open-end investment companies30 that pool 
money from many investors, referred to as shareholders of the fund, 
 
 27. Captive investors do not negotiate with the investment advisor at arm’s length. See 
infra note 229 and accompanying text. This Note also calls captive mutual fund investors 
“retail” investors. 
 28. A pension fund is an institutional investor. See Coates & Hubbard, supra note 12, at 
184 n.131 (“Institutional accounts vary widely, including trusts, foundations, life insurance 
companies, pension plans, and various levels of high-net-worth individuals.”). 
 29. See, e.g., William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and 
Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1409 (2006) (“[T]he industry’s 
faults can be found in the idiosyncratic structure of mutual funds, a structure that exacerbates 
the ability of managers to wield substantial power and to use that power to extract rents both 
overtly and surreptitiously from shareholders.”); Paul F. Roye, Director, Div. of Inv. Mgmt., 
SEC, Remarks before the Fund Governance Program Presented by the Mutual Fund Directors 
Forum and Fund Directions (Dec. 9, 2004) (“I fully understand that conflict oversight and 
management is not always easy—but it is a core part of your responsibilities as independent 
fund directors, particularly because of the conflicts inherent in the external management 
structure of mutual funds.”). Contra WALLISON & LITAN, supra note 7, at 29–31 (“The 
‘inherent conflict’ cited by the SEC and critics of the mutual fund industry, at least as far as fee-
setting is concerned, is nothing more than the usual divergence of interests between a buyer and 
a seller . . . .”). 
 30. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(1) (2006) (defining an open-end company as “a management 
company which is offering for sale or has outstanding any redeemable security of which it is the 
issuer”). 
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and then invest in a diversified portfolio of stocks, bonds, and other 
securities.31 Mutual funds are valuable because they allow small 
investors to diversify their holdings and thus reduce risk.32 They also 
provide professional management, liquidity,33 variety,34 and 
convenience to investors. 
Although mutual funds have the trappings of typical 
corporations, their external management structure sets them apart.35 
Like other corporations, for example IBM or General Motors, mutual 
funds are independent legal entities, owned by shareholders with 
voting rights and governed by a board of directors.36 But 
commentators have described mutual funds as “captive shell[s],”37 
“Spartan business organizations,”38 and “rudimentary legal vessel[s]”39 
because, unlike typical corporations, mutual funds are externally 
managed. That is, third parties perform all of the functions that the 
fund must perform to increase value. The fund itself has “no offices, 
no equipment, and no employees.”40 The third parties that a mutual 
fund relies on include an investment advisor, an underwriter 
 
 31. SEC, Mutual Funds, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mutfund.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 
2009). 
 32. WALLISON & LITAN, supra note 7, at 2 (“One of the most basic rules of personal 
finance is never to put all of one’s financial eggs in one basket. . . . This advice follows from the 
efficient market hypothesis, which holds that no single investor can have more information at 
any given moment than is in the market as a whole, and therefore no investor, no matter how 
skilled, can consistently ‘beat the market’ in picking individual securities.”). 
 33. Redeemable shares are a hallmark of mutual funds. Redeemable shares entitle 
investors to sell their shares back to the fund at the current net asset value minus any 
redemption or deferred sales load fees. See SEC, supra note 31 (describing traditional and 
distinguishing characteristics of mutual funds, including redeemable shares). Because shares are 
redeemable, new sales are crucial to the fund’s existence. Without new sales, a fund could be 
redeemed out of existence. John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: 
The Cost of Conflicts of Interest, 26 J. CORP. L. 609, 614 (2001). 
 34. In 2007, there were 8,752 mutual funds (including funds of funds). INV. CO. INST., supra 
note 2, at 15 fig.1.8. 
 35. See INV. CO. INST., A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING MUTUAL FUNDS 10 (2008), 
available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/bro_understanding_mfs_p.pdf (“Virtually all mutual funds 
are externally managed; they do not have employees of their own. Instead, their operations are 
conducted by affiliated organizations and independent contractors.”). 
 36. A. Joseph Warburton, Should Mutual Funds Be Corporations? A Legal & Econometric 
Analysis, 33 J. CORP. L. 745, 748 (2008). 
 37. John A. Otoshi, Note, Class Action Treatment of Shareholders’ Suits Under Section 
36(b) of the Investment Company Act, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 2039, 2039 (1983). 
 38. Birdthistle, supra note 29, at 1418. 
 39. Id. at 1409. 
 40. Id. 
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(typically a securities dealer), and a transfer agent (typically a bank).41 
This Note focuses on the investment advisor. 
The investment advisor is a professional money manager, 
independent of, but tightly connected to, the mutual fund.42 The 
investment advisor handles day-to-day management of the fund, 
which includes research regarding which securities to buy and sell and 
portfolio management.43 Additionally, the advisor completes the more 
pedestrian tasks of procuring office space and overseeing 
administrative staff.44 The investment advisor is often the fund’s initial 
sponsor and initial shareholder.45 Most funds are named for and 
marketed by their investment advisors.46 The close nexus between the 
investment advisor and the fund remains over time because after the 
advisor “gives birth to the fund. . . . the umbilical cord is never cut.”47 
The investment advisor becomes even more tightly connected to 
the fund through the board of directors. The board of a mutual fund, 
like any corporate board, is charged with serving the interests of the 
shareholders.48 The board’s additional responsibilities include 
selecting the investment advisor and other third-party providers, 
reviewing yearly third-party contracts,49 approving the investment 
advisor’s fees, establishing the fund’s investment objectives, and 
policing conflicts.50 The sponsor, again typically the investment 
advisor, appoints officers and affiliated directors to serve on the 
board. Then the investment advisor “recruits unaffiliated persons to 
 
 41. For more information on the role of the underwriter and transfer agent, see William P. 
Rogers & James N. Benedict, Money Market Fund Management Fees: How Much Is Too 
Much?, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1059, 1063 nn.10–11 (1982). For a brief overview of the types of 
service providers a fund typically relies on, see INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 164–68. 
 42. The investment advisor is a legal entity that has its own employees. INV. CO. INST., 
supra note 2, at 166. Merrill Lynch, Harris Associates, and Fidelity are examples of investment 
advisors. 
 43. Id. at 166–67. 
 44. Rogers & Benedict, supra note 41, at 1063. 
 45. INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 166. 
 46. See Edward Wyatt, Empty Suits in the Board Room; Under Fire, Mutual Fund Directors 
Seem Increasingly Hamstrung, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1998, at C1 (“In practice, of course, the 
entire operation is run by one fund company—Fidelity or Merrill Lynch, Navellier or 
Fundamental—which not only provides . . . services, but is the brand name that brings 
shareholders to the fund.”). 
 47. Conference on Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 726, 739 (1967) (remarks of Abraham 
L. Pomerantz). 
 48. Rogers & Benedict, supra note 41, at 1064. 
 49. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2006). 
 50. Warburton, supra note 36, at 750. 
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serve as independent directors.”51 Permitting investment advisors to 
select all of the members of the board reduces the likelihood that 
directors will strike hard bargains with investment advisors.52 
Additionally, individuals often serve on more than one board in a 
mutual fund complex managed by the investment advisor, and can 
reap substantial aggregate pay from these directorships. For example, 
in the Fidelity complex of funds, nine individuals served as 
independent directors for all 237 investment companies in the 
complex.53 Fidelity paid those individuals annual salaries ranging from 
$220,500 to $273,500.54 
Many critics have challenged the independence and effectiveness 
of mutual fund boards in light of this close nexus with the investment 
advisors. Professor Abraham L. Pomerantz, an early critic, notes the 
conflict: “[O]f all dualities and of all conflicts [in the American 
corporate] scene, nothing—but nothing—approaches the open end 
mutual fund for incestuous relationships.”55 He also criticizes how 
unaffiliated directors are chosen, noting that “[t]he men who need to 
be watched pick the watchdogs to watch them.”56 Professor Lyman 
Johnson also recognizes the conflict that arises when employees of 
the investment advisor sit on the board of the mutual fund—the 
employees and board members personally benefit from a contract 
that is good for the advisor, but adverse to the interests of the 
investor.57 Johnson calls for a more robust conception of director 
independence in mutual funds to protect shareholders, akin to that in 
other corporations.58 Industry insider and critic John C. Bogle59 
explains that investment advisors seek high returns not only for 
investors, but also for themselves. Noting that some investment 
advisors are publicly held, Bogle observes that they are beholden to 
the shareholders of their stock, not merely the shareholders of the 
 
 51. INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 165 (emphasis added). 
 52. Rogers & Benedict, supra note 41, at 1072. 
 53. Krantz v. Fidelity Mgmt. & Research Co., 98 F. Supp. 2d 150, 151 (D. Mass. 2000). 
 54. Id. at 151–52; see also Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 330–31 
(4th Cir. 2001) (dismissing a claim that overlapping service between twenty-two and thirty-eight 
boards with an aggregate compensation of either $65,000 or $81,000 rendered directors 
“interested”). 
 55. Conference on Mutual Funds, supra note 47, at 739 (remarks of Abraham L. 
Pomerantz). 
 56. Id. Pomerantz called for more SEC regulation. Id. at 740. 
 57. Johnson, supra note 17, at 505. 
 58. Id. at 527–34. 
 59. Founder and former CEO of The Vanguard Group. 
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fund.60 Perhaps surprisingly, two of the top three best performing 
American stocks from 1982 through 2007 were mutual fund 
sponsors—not funds themselves. Franklin Resources, in first place, 
had an overall return of 64,224 percent, whereas Eaton Vance, a 
Boston-based fund manager, returned 38,444 percent. By comparison, 
Berkshire Hathaway, Warren Buffet’s conglomerate, returned a 
paltry 19,424 percent.61 
The widely recognized,62 close nexus between the investment 
advisor and the fund has undermined the idea that boards impose 
meaningful limits on investment advisors—especially because boards 
are loathe to fire them.63 One observer notes that “the termination of 
advisory agreements is so rare as to be practically nonexistent.”64 
Firing an investment advisor would fundamentally alter the fund. 
Investors do not choose to invest in a fund because of the 
composition of the board; instead they invest with a particular 
investment advisor. After all, it is the advisor’s name on the fund and 
not the board’s. If the board fires the advisor it may nullify an 
essential reason many investors chose that fund.65 Boards may 
conclude that if investors are unhappy they will redeem their shares 
and invest elsewhere. Although the fund board of directors 
theoretically has the right to demand lower fees and fire investment 
advisors, boards rarely exercise those rights.66 That drastically reduces 
 
 60. BOGLE, supra note 6, at 145–46. 
 61. ‘If Only I Had Bought . . .’, USA TODAY, Apr. 16, 2007, at 8B, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/top25-stocks.htm. 
 62. See, e.g., Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d 923, 929–30 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(“Congress . . . recognized . . . the potentially incestuous relationships between many advisers 
and their funds . . . .”); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MUTUAL FUND FEES: ADDITIONAL 
DISCLOSURE COULD ENCOURAGE PRICE COMPETITION 82 (2000) (“Although most mutual 
funds are organized as corporations, their structure and operation differ from a typical 
corporation because of the relationship between the fund and its adviser. Typically, the adviser, 
who is a legal entity separate from the fund, conducts the fund’s operations, and the advisory 
fees it charges to the fund represent revenue to the adviser, creating a possible conflict of 
interest.”). 
 63. Even industry supporters acknowledge that boards “rarely fire” investment advisors. 
Coates & Hubbard, supra note 12, at 153. The authors, however, do not reach the conclusion 
that the structure of mutual funds prevents competition. Id. at 153–54. 
 64. Birdthistle, supra note 29, at 1410. Chief Judge Easterbrook recognized this reality in 
Harris Associates. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 634 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Mutual funds 
rarely fire their investment advisers . . . .”). 
 65. For example, thousands of investors flocked to the Magellan Fund to have Peter Lynch 
manage their money. See PETER S. LYNCH & JOHN ROTHCHILD, BEATING THE STREET 82–139 
(1993) (describing the Magellan Fund). 
 66. Freeman & Brown, supra note 33, at 617. 
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the board’s ability to control the investment advisor for the benefit of 
the shareholders. 
B. Mutual Fund Fees: An Overview 
The investment advisor is compensated through fees set in the 
board-approved management contract.67 These fees are based on 
assets under management. The advisor is paid the same percentage 
for good performance or bad performance. Since markets tend to rise 
over time, the assets’ value rises over time, which leads to steady fee 
increases over time, even without the manager adding value.68 
Because the fee level is not linked to performance, an investment 
advisor can generate a greater fee by either growing the fund’s assets 
through successful investing or by attracting new investors through 
promotion. Investors benefit from the former, but gain relatively little 
from the latter.69 Indeed, attracting new investors harms current 
investors because the current investors, rather than the advisor, pay 
the costs of recruiting new investors through 12b-1 fees.70 Thus, the 
advisor has an incentive to increase the number of investors, which 
increases its bottom line at the expense of fund shareholders. 
Investors pay two kinds of fees to their investment advisors: one-
time fees and ongoing expenses.71 One-time fees, sometimes called 
loads or sales charges, are transaction costs. They are a commission 
paid to a broker when an investor buys (sales load) or sells (back-end 
load or sales charge) shares. One-time fees are readily observable and 
more transparent than ongoing fees.72 
Ongoing fees are more pernicious for shareholders. Funds can 
hide them from investors because funds deduct them from fund assets 
before the funds distribute earnings to shareholders.73 These ongoing 
fees include a management fee, distribution fees (known as 12b-1 
 
 67. See 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)–15(c) (2006) (mandating board control over advisory contracts). 
 68. Money for Old Hope, ECONOMIST, Mar. 1, 2008, at 3 (discussing the asset management 
business as a whole, which includes but is not limited to mutual funds, and noting that “fees in 
the industry tend to grow at around 15% a year because markets rise by an average of 8% and 
savings grow by 5-6%.”). 
 69. Langevoort, supra note 8, at 1021. 
 70. See infra notes 74–77. 
 71. INV. CO. INST., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT MUTUAL FUND FEES 2–5 
(2004), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/bro_mf_fees_faq_p.pdf. 
 72. Cox & Payne, supra note 17, at 925. 
 73. INV. CO. INST., supra note 71, at 6. 
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fees),74 and other expenses.75 The largest of these ongoing expenses is 
the management fee, which is the fee the investment advisor charges 
for managing the fund’s portfolio of securities and providing related 
services.76 12b-1 fees pay for marketing and advertising activities and 
compensate salespeople who steer investors to the fund.77 The final 
category of ongoing fees, “other expenses,” is a catchall category that 
includes administrative costs like mailing and printing charges, as well 
as shareholder services such as toll-free phone lines and computerized 
account services.78 
C. Investment Advisors Have a Fiduciary Duty regarding Fees 
Congress has recognized the risk of self-dealing in the mutual 
fund industry relating to fees.79 Under the ICA, enacted in 1940, the 
board of directors, particularly the unaffiliated directors, was charged 
with defending investors against self-dealing by investment advisors.80 
Because of the mutual fund industry’s rapid growth in the 1950s, the 
SEC authorized the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce at the 
University of Pennsylvania to study the industry.81 The Wharton 
Report found that investment advisors charged “relatively high 
rates,”82 which competitive market forces did not reduce because of 
the close association between the advisors and the fund.83 Further, the 
report noted that the advisory fees charged to mutual fund clients 
were “substantially higher” than those charged to institutional 
investors.84 In the 1960s, the SEC conducted its own study of the 
mutual fund industry, which concluded that the existing restraints on 
 
 74. The authority for the distribution fee comes from the ICA Rule 12b-1, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 270.12b-1 (2009). For a criticism of 12b-1 fees, see generally Freeman, supra note 13. 
 75. INV. CO. INST., supra note 71, at 4–5. 
 76. Id. at 4. 
 77. Id. at 4–5. For other readings regarding 12b-1 fees, see Cox & Payne, supra note 17, at 
925 n.87. 
 78. INV. CO. INST., supra note 71, at 9. 
 79. See Freeman & Brown, supra note 33, at 616 (“To protect fund shareholders from self-
dealing, Congress imposed a requirement that at least forty percent of a fund board needs to be 
composed of directors ostensibly independent of the investment advisor.”). 
 80. Rogers & Benedict, supra note 41, at 1070. 
 81. Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, A Study of Mutual Funds, H.R. Rep. No. 
87-2274, at 28 (1966). 
 82. Id. at 29. 
 83. See id. at 30 (“[T]he special structural characteristics of this industry, with an external 
adviser closely affiliated with the management of the mutual fund, tend to weaken the 
bargaining position of the fund in the establishment of advisory fee rates.”). 
 84. Id. at 29. 
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investment advisors did not adequately protect investors.85 The SEC 
recommended substantial modifications to the ICA to address the 
problems with management fees.86 
In response to the SEC Report and the Wharton Report, 
Congress added Section 36(b) to the ICA in 1970.87 Section 36(b) 
established a fiduciary duty with respect to compensation between 
the investment advisor and the shareholders.88 This fiduciary duty 
replaced the corporate waste standard that previously had been the 
threshold to prove excessive fee cases.89 Section 36(b) notes that 
courts should give director and shareholder approval of management 
fees “such consideration . . . as is deemed appropriate under all the 
circumstances.”90 Both shareholders and the SEC have an express 
right to sue under the statute.91 The plaintiff has the burden of 
proving a breach of fiduciary duty, but is not required to show that 
“any defendant engaged in personal misconduct.”92 
II.  THE UNCERTAIN STATE OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY STANDARD 
UNDER SECTION 36(B) 
The enactment of Section 36(b) reflects a policy choice to imbue 
what was merely a contractual relationship with a fiduciary duty.93 
 
 85. See Report of the SEC on the Public Policy Implications of Investment Company 
Growth, H.R. Rep. No. 89-2337, at 12–13 (1966) (discussing the various ways in which the 
existing restraints on management compensation are inadequate, and providing 
recommendations to rectify the problem of unreasonable compensation). 
 86. Id. at 13; Rogers & Benedict, supra note 41, at 1081 (discussing the modifications the 
SEC recommended). 
 87. WALLISON & LITAN, supra note 7, at 32. 
 88. In pertinent part Section 36(b) provides: 
For the purposes of this subsection, the investment adviser of a registered investment 
company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of 
compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature, paid by such 
registered investment company or by the security holders thereof, to such investment 
adviser or any affiliated person of such investment adviser. 
15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006). 
 89. See Rogers & Benedict, supra note 41, at 1088 (“Prior to enactment of the section, 
courts had held that once a defendant demonstrated that a management fee was approved by 
the board and the shareholders of the fund, the plaintiff was required to establish that the fee 
was so high as to constitute a waste of corporate assets. This corporate waste standard had 
proved virtually impossible for plaintiffs to meet, and, in effect, precluded legal challenges to 
management fees.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 90. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(2). 
 91. Id. § 80a-35(b). 
 92. Id. § 80a-35(b)(1). 
 93. Johnson, supra note 17, at 528. 
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Congress did not leave fees to be determined by the market alone.94 
Unfortunately, Congress did not define or explain the term “fiduciary 
duty” as used in Section 36(b).95 Nor did the SEC and the mutual fund 
industry, the two primary actors engaged in the legislative debates, 
ever agree on what a fiduciary duty required.96 That task has been left 
to the courts. 
A. The Traditional Approach: Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset 
Management 
Gartenberg is the seminal case interpreting the fiduciary duty 
requirement of Section 36(b). The plaintiffs held shares in the then-
largest money market mutual fund.97 They claimed that the fund 
realized cost savings through economies of scale98 but was not passing 
the savings on to shareholders through lower fees.99 The plaintiffs 
urged that a “reasonableness” standard was the proper way to 
determine whether a breach of fiduciary duty occurred.100 The 
plaintiffs further contended that the district court erred by relying 
primarily on the management fees of other money market funds when 
determining if the defendants breached a fiduciary duty.101 The 
plaintiffs argued for an arm’s-length negotiation standard, which 
could not be satisfied by comparing fees between funds that were 
captives of their advisor, as is the case in all mutual funds.102 
The plaintiffs in Gartenberg lost; they failed to prove economies 
of scale existed or, even if they did exist, that they were not shared 
with shareholders.103 The court set forth two important frameworks 
 
 94. See Langevoort, supra note 8, at 1037 (“Once the mutual fund is viewed as a product to 
be marketed within liberal societal expectations as to fair advertising like any other, then any 
notion that the producer is a ‘fiduciary’ is awkward and disorienting. The transaction is instead 
simply embedded in the morals of the marketplace. To be sure, the law disagrees—the adviser is 
deemed a fiduciary to the fund and its investors.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 95. See Green v. Nuveen Advisory Corp., 295 F.3d 738, 742 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[Section] 
36(b) does not explain the term ‘fiduciary duty’ . . . .”). 
 96. Rogers & Benedict, supra note 41, at 1082–89 (“[T]he Commission and the industry 
never did concur on what the term ‘fiduciary duty’ meant in this context.”). 
 97. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d 923, 925, 928 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 98. Economies of scale are the cost advantages a firm realizes as it grows. See CAMPBELL 
R. MCCONNELL & STANLEY L. BRUE, MICROECONOMICS 160–62 (16th ed. 2004) (discussing 
economies of scale). 
 99. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928. 
 100. Id. at 927. 
 101. Id. at 927–28. 
 102. Id. at 928. 
 103. Freeman & Brown, supra note 33, at 645. 
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that have guided excessive fee decisions and boards approving fees 
since 1982. First, “[t]o be guilty of a violation of § 36(b), therefore, 
the adviser-manager must charge a fee that is so disproportionately 
large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered 
and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.”104 
Next, the court outlined six factors to consider when applying Section 
36(b)’s fiduciary duty standard: “(a) the nature and quality of services 
provided to fund shareholders; (b) the profitability of the fund to the 
adviser-manager; (c) fallout benefits; (d) economies of scale; 
(e) comparative fee structures; and (f) the independence and 
conscientiousness of the trustees.”105 
Courts and boards of directors use the Gartenberg framework. 
Courts of appeals in the Third106 and Fourth Circuits107 have followed 
it, along with many district courts.108 Mutual fund boards must 
consider each Gartenberg factor in their fee approval process109 
because the SEC adopted rules that require boards to disclose their 
analysis of each factor.110 Although no shareholder has ever prevailed 
against an investment advisor in court under Gartenberg, 
shareholders have achieved some settlements.111 
 
 104. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928. 
 105. Krinsk v. Fund Asset Mgmt., 875 F.2d 404, 409 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing Gartenberg, 694 
F.2d at 929–30). 
 106. Krantz v. Prudential Invs. Fund Mgmt. LLC, 305 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2002) (per 
curiam). 
 107. Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 326–27 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 108. See, e.g., Lori A. Martin & Martin Lybecker, It’s Too Early to Disregard the 
Gartenberg Factors During Advisory Fee Renewals, WILMERHALE, May 27, 2008, 
http://www.wilmerhale.com/publications/whPubsDetail.aspx?publication=8329 (noting that 
Gartenberg “has been applied by district courts in the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits”). 
 109. See Phillips et al., supra note 16 (“[D]irectors should continue to engage in a 
thoroughgoing Section 15(c) process that considers the Gartenberg factors, along with other 
information the directors deem important, in determining the reasonableness of management 
fees.”). 
 110. Disclosure Regarding Approval of Investment Advisory Contracts by Directors of 
Investment Companies, 69 Fed. Reg. 39,797, 39,801 (June 30, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
239, 240, and 274). 
 111. JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES 
REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 1116–17 (5th ed. 2006). 
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B. The Market Approach: Jones v. Harris Associates 
1. A New Sherriff in Town—Easterbrook’s Disclosure-Based 
Approach.  In Jones v. Harris Associates, decided in May 2008, Chief 
Judge Frank Easterbrook authored an opinion disapproving the 
Gartenberg approach.112 Harris Associates stands alone as the only 
appellate opinion rejecting Gartenberg. 
The plaintiff shareholders sued Harris Associates, the investment 
advisor to the Oakmark complex of mutual funds,113 contending that 
the advisor’s fees were excessive.114 Though the plaintiffs applied the 
Gartenberg factors to their set of facts, they “urge[d] the court to 
consider whether Gartenberg should be uncritically accepted and 
applied.”115 The plaintiffs highlighted two “serious flaws”116 with the 
Gartenberg standard: first, Gartenberg fails to appreciate the 
immateriality of recent fund performance;117 second, it understates the 
fiduciary duty standard, which they contended should be a 
reasonableness standard.118 
Not only did the Harris Associates plaintiffs question the 
Gartenberg factors generally, like the Gartenberg plaintiffs,119 they 
disagreed specifically with the district court’s application of the 
comparative fee structure factor.120 They argued the application was 
flawed because it did not consider that the fees are set incestuously.121 
The district court did not allow the comparison to institutional 
investors, which the plaintiffs argued was the best example of a fee 
negotiated at arm’s length.122 
 
 112. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Having had another chance 
to study this question, we now disapprove the Gartenberg approach.”). 
 113. Id. at 629. 
 114. Id. at 631. 
 115. Brief and Required Short Appendix of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 33, Jones v. Harris 
Assocs., No. 07-1624 (7th Cir. 2008), 2007 WL 1582568 [hereinafter Brief of Plaintiffs]. 
 116. Id. at 34. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 34–35. 
 119. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 120. Brief of Plaintiffs, supra note 115, at 37. 
 121. Id.; Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 122. Brief of Plaintiffs, supra note 115, at 27. Chief Judge Easterbrook conflated the 
plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the district court’s comparative fee analysis with the plaintiffs’ 
description of Gartenberg’s flaws. Compare Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d at 631 (stating that the 
plaintiffs contended that the court should not follow Gartenberg because it relies too much on 
the market and disregards the fees charged to institutional clients), with Brief of Plaintiffs, supra 
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As the plaintiffs requested, the Seventh Circuit did not 
uncritically accept Gartenberg. But unlike the plaintiffs, the court 
thought that Gartenberg relied “too little on markets.”123 The court 
rejected both the plaintiffs’ reasonableness test124 and the Gartenberg 
standard.125 Under its own, new framework, the Seventh Circuit 
concluded that “[a] fiduciary must make full disclosure and play no 
tricks but is not subject to a cap on compensation.”126 The court 
qualified this standard in the case of unusual fees: “It is possible to 
imagine compensation so unusual that a court will infer that deceit 
must have occurred, or that the persons responsible for [the] decision 
have abdicated . . . .”127 
Chief Judge Easterbrook’s new approach relies heavily on the 
markets and works from a baseline assumption that the mutual fund 
market is efficient.128 It rejects any instruction gleaned from the 
debates of the late 1960s and 1970 regarding the poor state of mutual 
fund competition.129 Instead, Chief Judge Easterbrook wryly observed 
that “[a] lot has happened in the last 38 years.”130 The Seventh 
Circuit’s approach relies on self-regulating markets and the findings 
of an academic article authored by John C. Coates and R. Glenn 
Hubbard.131 Easterbrook highlighted that the Coates and Hubbard 
study determined that “thousands of mutual funds are plenty, that 
investors can and do protect their interests by shopping, and that 
regulating advisory fees through litigation is unlikely to do more good 
 
note 115, at 33–37 (noting that the comparative fee structure analysis of the district court was 
inappropriate because it assumed market competition set mutual fund fee rates and ignored a 
comparison to institutional clients’ fees, but urging the court to consider whether Gartenberg 
should be uncritically accepted because it fails to appreciate the immateriality of recent fund 
performance and understates the fiduciary duty standard). 
 123. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d at 632. 
 124. Id. (“Section 36(b) does not say that fees must be ‘reasonable’ in relation to a judicially 
created standard. It says instead that the adviser has a fiduciary duty.”). 
 125. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 126. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d at 632. 
 127. Id. At first blush this standard seems similar to Gartenberg’s “disproportionately large” 
standard, but, as Judge Posner’s dissent points out, the panel’s standard can only be compared 
to other mutual fund fees, whereas the Gartenberg standard is “not so limited.” Jones v. Harris 
Assocs., 537 F.3d 728, 732 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc). 
 128. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d at 634 (“Mutual funds come much closer to the model of 
atomistic competition than do most other markets.”). 
 129. See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text (describing the mutual fund studies of the 
1960s). 
 130. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d at 633. 
 131. Id. at 634 (citing Coates & Hubbard, supra note 12). 
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than harm.”132 The Chief Judge was particularly concerned that 
Section 36(b)’s fiduciary duty not be interpreted as a means of 
judicial price setting or rate regulation.133 Instead, he declared that 
securities laws “work largely by requiring disclosure and then 
allowing price to be set by competition in which investors make their 
own choices.”134 He disregarded comparisons between institutional 
investors and captive mutual funds because “no court would inquire 
whether a salary normal among similar institutions is excessive.”135 
The plaintiffs lost because Harris Associates did not “pull[] the wool 
over the eyes of the disinterested trustees.”136 The panel rejected the 
notion that the captivity of mutual funds curtails competition.137 The 
Seventh Circuit denied the plaintiffs’ petition for en banc review.138 
2. Posner Dissents.139  “Everyone loves a brawl. And all the more 
so when the brawlers are smart, biting, literate debaters . . . .”140 Chief 
Judge Easterbrook and Judge Posner are “the heavyweights” 141 of the 
law and economics movement. Posner’s dissent hit back against 
Easterbrook’s panel opinion and highlighted the aberrational nature 
of the panel opinion. Judge Posner questioned the economics 
underlying the panel decision, framed mutual fund fees as executive 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 635 (“As § 36(b) does not make the federal judiciary a rate regulator, after the 
fashion of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the judgment of the district court is 
affirmed.”); id. at 633 (“Section 36(b) does not create a rate-regulation mechanism, and 
plaintiffs’ proposal to create such a mechanism in 2008 cannot be justified by suppositions about 
the market conditions of 1970.”); id. (“Judicial price-setting does not accompany fiduciary 
duties. Section 36(b) does not call for a departure from this norm.”). 
 134. Id. at 635. 
 135. Id. at 632. 
 136. Id. at 635. 
 137. Id. at 632. 
 138. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 537 F.3d 728, 729 (7th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 
 139. The panel voted unanimously to deny the plaintiffs’ petition for a rehearing. But the 
rules of the Seventh Circuit permit a judge to request that any motion be considered by the 
court en banc. 7th Cir. R. 1(a)(2). A judge, likely Judge Posner, requested a vote on the request 
for an en banc hearing. Since a majority of the circuit did not favor a rehearing, the petition was 
denied. Judge Posner dissented from that denial. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 537 F.3d 728, 729 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 140. J. Mark Ramseyer, Commentary, Not-So-Ordinary Judges in Ordinary Courts: 
Teaching Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 120 HARV. L. REV. 1199, 1199 (2007) (detailing another 
case in which Judges Easterbrook and Posner disagreed on a fiduciary duty standard). 
 141. Floyd Norris, The Supremes Will Decide Which Economics Makes Legal Sense, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2009, http://norris.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/09/the-supremes-will-decide-which-
economics-makes-legal-sense/. 
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compensation,142 rejected the argument that boards protect investors, 
and advocated examining the fee differences between institutional 
investors and retail investors. 
Though Easterbrook said that Harris Associates was not the first 
time the Seventh Circuit had questioned Gartenberg,143 Posner 
pointed out that both cases Easterbrook cited to suggest a previous 
disagreement with Gartenberg were not excessive fee cases.144 Judge 
Posner called the economic analysis underlying the panel opinion 
“ripe for reexamination,”145 and quipped that the panel “misse[d] the 
point”146 regarding unreasonable compensation as evidence of a 
breach of fiduciary duty.147 Questioning Easterbrook’s rejection of 
Gartenberg, Posner observed that the academic article Easterbrook 
relied on “expressly approves Gartenberg,”148 and that the standard 
has not proven very hard on advisors.149 
Posner approached mutual fund boards of directors with 
skepticism. He rejected Easterbrook’s faith in boards, noting the 
“feeble incentives of boards of directors to police compensation.”150 In 
addition, he remarked that boards are often composed of CEOs of 
other companies and thus boards are likely to highly value, and 
compensate, the role.151 Judge Posner highlighted the shortcomings of 
the incentive structure and its detrimental effect on competition by 
citing Northwestern business school Professor Camelia M. Kuhnen, 
who has said, “[f]und directors and advisory firms that manage the 
funds hire each other preferentially based on past interactions. When 
directors and the management are more connected, advisors capture 
more rents and are monitored by the board less intensely.”152 
 
 142. For a critical commentary on executive compensation by Judge Posner, see generally 
Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, if So, What if Anything Should Be Done 
About It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1013 (2009). 
 143. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d at 632. Chief Judge Easterbrook cited Green v. Nuveen 
Advisory Corp., 295 F.3d 738 (7th Cir. 2002), and Green v. Fund Asset Management, 286 F.3d 
682 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 144. Harris Assocs., 537 F.3d at 729 (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 145. Id. at 730. 
 146. Id. at 732. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 729. 
 149. Id. at 730. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 730–31 (quoting Camelia M. Kuhnen, Social Networks, Corporate Governance 
and Contracting in the Mutual Fund Industry (Mar. 1, 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=849705). 
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Finally, Posner was concerned about the price differential 
between the plaintiff mutual fund investors and independent funds.153 
The mutual fund investors, whom Posner referred to as “captives,” 
pay more than twice what the independent funds pay.154 Easterbrook 
accepted the difference because “[d]ifferent clients call for different 
commitments of time.”155 Easterbrook suggested several reasons why 
mutual funds may take more time, and thus cost more, than pension 
funds.156 Posner called Easterbrook’s suggestions “purely . . . 
speculation, rather than anything having an evidentiary or empirical 
basis.”157 He then explained that the panel’s “so unusual” standard 
only applies to comparisons among mutual funds, preventing 
comparisons of mutual funds to the institutional investors who 
negotiate at arm’s length—a comparison that Gartenberg’s “so 
disproportionately large” standard may permit.158 Because the 
governance structure of mutual funds that has produced the current 
fee levels is industry-wide, Posner cautioned that rejecting 
comparisons among institutional and retail investors could lead to a 
price floor.159 
Though Posner conceded that the “outcome of this case may be 
correct,”160 he strongly rejected the process. He concluded that the 
Seventh Circuit should have heard the case en banc for three reasons: 
its decision created a circuit split, the issue was extremely important 
to the mutual fund industry, and the panel’s analysis was “one-
sided.”161 This public, foundational disagreement between the two 
“leading lights”162 of the law and economics community made Harris 
Associates a news item163 and left in its wake significant uncertainty 
about the state of the fiduciary duty standard in excessive fee cases.164 
 
 153. Id. at 731. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 634 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Harris Assocs., 537 F.3d at 731 (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 158. Id. at 732. 
 159. Id. A price floor is the value below which a price will not, or will not be allowed to, fall. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 732–33. 
 162. Norris, supra note 141. 
 163. E.g., Floyd Norris, Judges in Dispute over Mutual Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2008, at 
C3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/16/business/16place.html. 
 164. See, e.g., Ropes & Gray, Appeals Court Rejects Mutual Fund Excessive Fee Claims, 
Adopting New Standard for Evaluation of Fees, ROPES & GRAY, May 20, 2008, 
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Speculation began about whether the Supreme Court would step in 
and reconcile the disagreement,165 with one commentator going so far 
as to suggest that Posner’s dissent resembled an “appellate brief, and 
could help to get this issue before the Supreme Court.”166 In March 
2009, likely based on at least two of the reasons that Posner cited to 
call for en banc review—namely, the circuit split and the importance 
of the issues—the Supreme Court granted certiorari.167 
III.  ANALYSIS OF GARTENBERG AND HARRIS ASSOCIATES 
On November 2, 2009, the Supreme Court will hear arguments 
regarding the appropriate fiduciary duty standard to be applied in 
excessive fee cases.168 Scholars have spilled a significant amount of ink 
discussing the shortcomings of the traditional Gartenberg approach to 
the fiduciary duty standard. Section A of this Part surveys those 
criticisms of Gartenberg. Section B critiques Harris Associates. This 
Note then continues to Part IV, which proposes a fiduciary duty 
standard that harnesses the power of the market by modifying 
Gartenberg. 
A. Criticism of the Gartenberg Standard 
Though Gartenberg has been widely used by the judiciary and 
the SEC, some academics have strongly criticized it. One of the 
industry’s most prolific critics, Professor John P. Freeman, calls the 
Gartenberg factors “passé,”169 noting that “[t]hey were of limited use 
originally, but today they are of no use at all.”170 He characterizes 
Gartenberg as “creat[ing] an unworkable, unfair, scavenger hunt-style 
liability test”171 and goes on to call the current system for determining 
breaches of fiduciary duty a “failure.”172 In 2001, Freeman and Brown 
concluded that mutual funds were being systematically overpriced 
 
http://www.ropesgray.com/litigationalert/ (“The immediate consequences of the Harris opinion 
are difficult to predict.”). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Norris, supra note 163. 
 167. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 129 S. Ct. 1579 (2009). 
 168. Supreme Court, November 2, 2009 Session, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_ 
arguments/argument_calendars/MonthlyArgumentCalNovember2009.html (last visited Aug. 27, 
2009). 
 169. Freeman et al., supra note 17, at 126. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 86. 
 172. Id. 
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and set forth two proposals for changing the environment in which 
the fees are “set, disclosed, and evaluated.”173 First, they proposed 
requiring funds to report financial information on a standardized 
basis. They hypothesized that standardized reporting would allow 
investors to compare costs.174 Second, they proposed requiring funds 
to disclose advisory fee arrangements with nonfund clients.175 Most 
recently, building on their earlier work, they have proposed that the 
Gartenberg factors should be replaced with a new framework—the 
McDonnell Douglas test that the Supreme Court outlined when it 
analyzed a disparate treatment employment discrimination case 
based on circumstantial evidence.176 
Other scholars criticized Gartenberg for its practical failure to 
provide the meaningful shareholder protection that Congress 
intended. Professor Langevoort has argued that Gartenberg parallels 
state law corporate waste statutes “even though the legislative history 
behind section 36(b) explicitly wanted something more than a waste 
test.”177 Others have argued that it is riddled with “ambiguity”178 for 
seemingly allowing plaintiffs to establish a breach of fiduciary duty by 
a materially flawed process but then requiring “a substantive 
economic showing of fee excessiveness [as the] sine qua non of 
liability.”179 How lower courts resolve this ambiguity influences 
 
 173. Freeman & Brown, supra note 33, at 614. 
 174. Id. at 669. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Freeman et al., supra note 17, at 144–45 (“Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, 
once a prima facie case of disparate treatment is made, the defendant must produce evidence to 
rebut the presumption of discrimination. At this point it becomes incumbent on the defendant 
to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason explaining why the disparity exists. In the 
fund fee context, the advisor would need to produce evidence showing that the captive fund was 
fairly treated—a task it could accomplish by identifying and quantifying the service differences 
between picking portfolio securities for third-party institutional clients versus the captive 
mutual fund. Once the defendant has presented evidence to explain the fee disparity, it remains 
for the plaintiff to show the pricing disparity evidences a breach of fiduciary duty. The plaintiff 
would do this by proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the differences in services 
the defendant identified do not adequately explain or justify the fee disparity. Here, the 
plaintiff’s ultimate burden will be to show that the captive fund was charged substantially more 
than free market clients for like work.” (footnote omitted)). 
 177. Langevoort, supra note 8, at 1024. 
 178. John M. Greabe et al., Moving Beyond Gartenberg: A Process-Based and Comparative 
Approach to § 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 28 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 
133, 146 (2009). The authors represent the plaintiffs in Jones v. Harris Associates. Jones v. 
Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 629 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 179. Greabe et al., supra note 178, at 146. 
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beliefs about the mutual fund industry at the time that “Congress 
deemed competition inadequate (and regulation essential).”185 He 
emphasized that “[a] lot has happened in the last 38 years.”186 The 
examples in this Section illustrate that Easterbrook ignored the 
language of Section 36(b) in an effort to sunset the statute—that is, 
interpret it out of practical existence. 
a. Easterbrook’s Standard Satisfies His Two Basic Components of 
Securities Law but Ignores the Plain Language of the Statute.  
Traditionally, a fiduciary duty encompasses a duty of care and a duty 
of loyalty as well as an obligation to act in good faith.187 Easterbrook’s 
new standard falls far short of those standards and merely requires 
“no tricks” and “full disclosure.” These two pillars parallel his “two 
basic components” of securities law, which he outlined in a 1984 
academic article: “a prohibition against fraud, and requirements of 
disclosure.”188 The prohibition against fraud is exemplified by the no 
tricks requirement, while his emphasis on disclosure translates to full 
disclosure in Harris Associates. 
Disclosure allows boards and shareholders to make informed 
decisions. An informed decision, however, may be a necessary, 
though not sufficient, condition for an investment advisor to meet its 
fiduciary duty. The statute requires more than full disclosure because 
Congress elected not to give conclusive weight to the board’s 
decisions.189 That is, even if disclosure were perfect and the board and 
shareholders approved the advisory fee contract, a court could still 
find that the investment advisor breached its fiduciary duty. Congress 
likely left courts this option because it realized that full disclosure 
does not protect investors in the mutual fund industry because the 
market is not efficient.190 It is unlikely, therefore, that disclosure alone 
would fulfill the fiduciary duty Congress established in Section 36(b). 
Easterbrook’s new standard allows full disclosure to insulate 
investment advisors when the statute does not, and thus his standard 
contravenes the statute. 
 
 185. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 633 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). 
 188. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of 
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 669 (1984). 
 189. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(2) (2006). 
 190. For a discussion of the inefficiency of the mutual fund market, see Part III.B.2. 
JOHNSON IN FINAL FINAL.DOC 9/15/2009  9:27:27 PM 
2009] MUTUAL FUND EXCESSIVE FEE CASES  169 
Easterbrook’s prohibition against fraud (no tricks) also ignores 
the language of the statute, which expressly states that “[i]t shall not 
be necessary to allege or prove that any defendant engaged in 
personal misconduct.” Though the statute does not define personal 
misconduct, playing tricks likely would be an example. Easterbrook, 
however, would require plaintiffs to show that the investment advisor 
“pulled the wool over the eyes of the disinterested”191 board members 
if the advisor made a full disclosure—a showing of misconduct that 
the statute’s plain language does not require. 
One prong of Easterbrook’s standard—disclosure—does not 
protect advisors from excessive fee findings according to the plain 
language of the statute. The other prong—no tricks—is expressly not 
required by the statute. While Easterbrook’s standard parallels his 
view of the purpose of the securities laws by prohibiting fraud and 
secrecy, the fiduciary duty established by the statute requires more. 
b. Easterbrook Gives Boards More Power than the Statute Gives 
Them.  Easterbrook powerfully summons trust law to define the 
fiduciary duty in Section 36(b). He states that, “when the settlor or 
the persons charged with the trust’s administration make a decision, it 
is conclusive.”192 Analogized to the mutual fund industry, when the 
boards of directors charged with making decisions regarding advisory 
contracts make those decisions, they are conclusive.193 As Part I noted, 
however, investment advisors appoint mutual fund board members. 
That leaves the investment advisor seemingly sitting on both sides of 
the contract negotiations. This situation resembles a conflict of 
interest that does not exist in typical trust law. To partially alleviate 
this conflict of interest, Congress uniquely protected shareholders by 
giving weight, but not conclusive weight, to board decisions. 
The only time that the Easterbrook standard would not give 
conclusive weight to a board decision would be if the “compensation 
[was] so unusual that a court [would] infer that deceit must have 
occurred.”194 This interpretation blatantly disregards the statutory 
language, which states that approval by the board of directors or the 
shareholders “shall be given such consideration by the court as is 
deemed appropriate under all the circumstances.”195 Easterbrook 
 
 191. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d at 635. 
 192. Id. at 632. 
 193. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2006). 
 194. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d at 632. 
 195. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(2). 
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reduced “all the circumstances” to situations in which courts can infer 
deceit. Simply stated, Easterbrook gave more weight to boards’ 
decisions than did Congress. 
In sum, Easterbrook reduced the value of the fiduciary duty to 
shareholders by ignoring the prescriptions of the statute that do not 
require a showing of personal misconduct and that give board 
decisions appropriate consideration under all circumstances but not 
conclusive weight. To offer any protection to shareholders in practice, 
the limited fiduciary duty that Easterbrook created would require an 
efficient market. But when Congress enacted Section 36(b) it found 
that an efficient market did not exist in the mutual fund industry. 
Many scholars continue to agree, though dissent exists. 
2. Easterbrook’s Standard Fails to Protect Shareholders in an 
Inefficient Market. Easterbrook applied his dominating principle of 
securities regulation—“anyone willing to disclose the right things can 
sell or buy whatever he wants at whatever price the market will 
sustain”196—to the mutual fund industry. This application produced 
the disclosure-based standard set forward in Harris Associates. An 
important assumption underlies this dominating principle—that the 
product, here investment management, is sold in an efficient market. 
If the market is not efficient—that is, if it is not price competitive—
then the market is not actually establishing and sustaining the price, 
but taking the price established by a monopolist, cartel, or regulator. 
Disclosure does not make a market efficient, but it does make pricing 
in an efficient market accurate. 
Harris Associates’ disclosure-based standard relies on Professor 
Coates and Dean Hubbard’s argument that the mutual fund industry 
is price competitive197 and that the structure of captive boards and 
nearly irreplaceable investment advisors does not hinder that 
competitiveness.198 But many scholars disagree with Professor Coates 
and Dean Hubbard’s conclusion that the mutual fund industry is 
efficient. Two industry critics on different sides of the ideological 
spectrum, Peter Wallison from the American Enterprise Institute and 
Robert Litan from the Brookings Institute, do not believe that the 
 
 196. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 188, at 670. 
 197. Coates & Hubbard, supra note 12, at 154 (“[W]e find that enough investors are 
sensitive to advisory pricing that higher fees significantly reduce fund market shares.”). 
 198. Id. at 153 (“The periodic attacks on the mutual fund industry start with a correct 
premise—that mutual fund boards rarely fire advisers—but reach a faulty conclusion—that the 
structure of mutual funds prevents competition.”). 
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mutual fund industry is price competitive. According to Wallison and 
Litan, competitive markets conform to the “law of one price,” 
meaning that prices converge at a common level.199 In the mutual fund 
industry, however, prices do not conform to a common level. In fact, 
the authors note that the price dispersion in one large sector of the 
mutual fund industry is 300 percent.200 
In addition to failing to conform to the law of one price, the 
mutual fund industry does not have other traditional markers present 
in efficient markets. Mutual funds shares are not traded in organized 
markets; therefore arbitrageurs cannot take advantage of 
mispricing.201 Insider compensation is based, not on performance, but 
on assets under management. Directors are paid in cash and not 
shares of the fund. Institutional investors do not push down prices for 
retail investors. And finally, no external market for corporate control 
exists because shares are redeemable.202 The lack of these markers led 
Professor Langevoort to warn against a “facile analogy”203 between 
mutual funds and business corporations because the markers of an 
efficient market do not “operate[] with any power in the world of 
mutual funds.”204 
Without the strictures of an efficient, competitive market, 
Easterbrook’s dominating principle of “anything, at any price, as long 
as there is appropriate disclosure” perpetuates inflated compensation 
for investment advisors. Although full disclosure does not ensure 
competitive pricing, regulation may. Congress regulated investment 
advisors’ fees by adopting the fiduciary duty in Section 36(b). 
Congress intended that this duty protect shareholders. That 
protection should not be sacrificed by the Seventh Circuit’s 
determination that an efficient market offers investors all the 
protection they merit. 
 
 199. See WALLISON & LITAN, supra note 7, at 8 (“The [mutual fund] industry . . . does not 
appear to conform to the ‘law of one price’—that is, the prices of the collective investment 
services that mutual funds provide are not converging toward a common level, although 
convergence would be expected in a competitive market.”). 
 200. Id. at 9. 
 201. E.g., Cox & Payne, supra note 17, at 911 (“[I]t is not conceivable that meaningful 
arbitrage can be introduced efficiently in the pricing of mutual fund shares . . . .”); Edwin J. 
Elton, Martin J. Gruber & Jeffrey A. Busse, Are Investors Rational? Choices Among Index 
Funds, 59 J. FIN. 261, 286 (2004) (observing that arbitrage opportunities do not exist in mutual 
funds). 
 202. Langevoort, supra note 8, at 1032. 
 203. Id. at 1031. 
 204. Id. 
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IV.  DEVELOPING AN APPROPRIATE FIDUCIARY DUTY: PROPOSALS 
FOR CHANGE 
As the mutual fund industry grows in size and importance to 
American household, retirement, and education savings, the fiduciary 
duty that Congress established in 1970 should be interpreted in a way 
that maximizes shareholder protection while utilizing market forces 
to do so. Harris Associates’ assurance that the market gives mutual 
fund shareholders what they deserve does not erase the fiduciary duty 
Congress imposed. 
It is imperative that gains are not unreasonably siphoned to the 
managers to the detriment of the shareholders.205 Both shareholders 
and boards must vigilantly monitor the level and types of fees 
investment advisors demand because fees compound out of investors’ 
bottom lines just as interest compounds into them. Ideally, mutual 
fund investors should select their funds based on low fees and boards 
should enforce a well-developed fiduciary duty. Although the courts 
cannot affect investor purchasing patterns, they can develop a 
meaningful fiduciary duty. 
The law of fiduciary duty is situation-specific.206 The fiduciary 
duty in Section 36(b) as interpreted under either Gartenberg or Harris 
Associates is far from the “punctilio of an honor”207 that Justice 
Cardozo described while sitting on the New York state bench. 
Professor Deborah DeMott has attributed the elusiveness of fiduciary 
obligations to their nascence in courts of equity rather than law.208 
Rules like the business judgment rule,209 which guides courts in most 
of their dealings with corporate boards, can define fiduciary duties, 
but their situation-specific nature makes fiduciary duties more akin to 
standards. 
Though Section 36(b)’s fiduciary duty requires situation-specific 
analysis, the evolution and requirements of the duty can be explained 
through a framework introduced by Professor Edward B. Rock. He 
suggests that Delaware corporate law standards are articulated 
 
 205. John Bogle argues that this is already happening as managers charge excessive fees and 
focus on salesmanship over stewardship. BOGLE, supra note 11, at 167. 
 206. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 
DUKE L.J. 879, 879. 
 207. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
 208. DeMott, supra note 206, at 880. 
 209. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (discussing the business 
judgment rule). 
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through narrative processes—that judges, like preachers, tell 
instructive stories that guide the actions of others.210 This narration 
leads to a set of parables211 that “fill out the normative job 
description . . . of critical players.”212 The fiduciary duty that Congress 
created in Section 36(b) can be analyzed like Delaware corporate law 
because the community of investment advisors and mutual fund 
board of director members is similar in size213 and composition to the 
“surprisingly small . . . community”214 of senior managers and 
directors of large public companies and their lawyers. Owing to this 
similarity, Professor Rock’s observation regarding the development 
of corporate law through evolutionary narratives can guide the 
development of the fiduciary duty under Section 36(b). 
Judicial opinions are like data points that shape the narratives 
that guide directors’ understanding of their jobs. Boards of directors 
and courts have already begun incorporating the Gartenberg factors 
into the narrative of Section 36(b) fiduciary duties.215 The addition of 
Harris Associates as a new data point confuses the narrative because 
Harris Associates changed the fiduciary duty standard from a fairness-
based to a disclosure-based standard. This change leaves boards 
asking how they should navigate Harris Associates and Gartenberg 
simultaneously. Should boards continue to be concerned with the 
harbingers of arm’s-length bargaining like Gartenberg mandates? Or 
has the board performed its duty by making a decision that is not “so 
unusual” that a court will infer deceit as Harris Associates allows? 
Does it depend on the circuit in which the board sits? Rock’s 
principal observation—that courts develop law through a narrative 
process—shows the potential power of Harris Associates. As Harris 
Associates becomes part of the narrative, it will assume power by 
 
 210. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Though over eight thousand mutual funds exist, fewer than seven hundred firms serve 
as fund sponsors. INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 13, 15. 
 214. Rock, supra note 210, at 1013. 
 215. See e.g., Martin & Lybecker, supra note 108 (“Independent directors should continue 
to consider the Gartenberg factors . . . . The Gartenberg approach has shaped how mutual fund 
boards of directors have conducted so–called 15(c) renewals for almost thirty years . . . . 
[B]oards of directors can clearly document that they have served as independent watchdogs on 
the management of investment companies by continuing to review the nature and quality of the 
services provided to the investment company and its shareholders.”); Krinsk v. Fund Asset 
Mgmt., 875 F.2d 404, 409–12 (2d Cir. 1989) (discussing each Gartenberg factor). 
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impacting mutual fund attorneys and boards of directors’ 
deliberations and decisions regarding fees. But Harris Associates 
should not be given such power. Its disclosure-based standard runs 
counter to Congress’s intent in establishing Section 36(b). 
Gartenberg, too, though it plays a starring role in the existing 
narrative surrounding the fiduciary duty in excessive fee cases, has 
not proven that it can carry out Congress’s intent. Recall that 
shareholders have never won under Gartenberg.216 Some 
commentators have suggested creating a new standard for proving 
excessive fee cases.217 But this proposal would create uncertainty by 
clearing away the narrative work that courts have built up to this 
point. Instead of building a new fiduciary duty from scratch, the 
Court should continue to use the Gartenberg factors with two 
important modifications. These modifications would strengthen the 
integrity of the fiduciary duty between investment advisors and 
shareholders, while requiring courts and boards to only slightly 
modify their analysis. Continuing to use a factor-based test like 
Gartenberg would allow the courts to discuss in detail case-specific 
facts, building a narrative that would help define the contours of 
Section 36(b)’s fiduciary duty and guide future boards when 
approving fees.218 
First, as Judge Posner and the Harris Associates plaintiffs argued, 
Gartenberg’s fifth factor, comparative fee structures, must be 
broadened to include a comparison of the fees mutual fund clients 
and institutional clients pay. As this Section explains, advisors should 
be able to pass the additional variable costs of administering a retail 
fund over an institutional fund to retail clients,219 but a management 
 
 216. See sources cited supra note 17. 
 217. Freeman et al., supra note 17, at 144–45 (proposing replacing the Gartenberg test with 
the McDonnell Douglas framework). 
 218. The Gartenberg factors do not have to end a board’s fiduciary duty analysis. Professor 
Rock suggests that factors and cases can guide critical players like boards but do not create a 
safe harbor from vigilantly performing their duties. Confusion reigns when “a player interprets 
the cases as establishing a substantive safe harbor, rather than explicating a conduct norm.” 
Rock, supra note 210, at 1063. Boards should work to protect shareholders even if that work 
takes them beyond Gartenberg. 
 219. The plaintiffs in Harris Associates “maintain[ed] that a fiduciary may charge its 
controlled clients no more than its independent clients.” Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 
631 (7th Cir. 2008). This Note disagrees. A fund should be able to charge its controlled clients 
more than institutional clients if the difference in price arises from actual administrative cost 
differences. It may be objectionable, however, for a fund to profit from its controlled clients 
more than from its independent clients when that extra profit results from a lack of arm’s-length 
bargaining. 
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fee in excess of the additional administrative costs should strongly 
indicate investment advisors have breached their fiduciary duties.220 
Next, the second Gartenberg factor, the profitability of the fund to the 
advisor-manager, should be eliminated because it removes market-
based incentives for investment advisors to lower fees. 
A. Broaden the Comparative Fee Structure Factor 
The statute’s legislative history, although “tortuous,”221 can help 
determine the broad principles behind the fiduciary duty that 
Congress enacted through Section 36(b). Though the SEC and the 
mutual fund industry, the two primary actors engaged in the 
legislative debates, never agreed on what the fiduciary duty 
required,222 a sensible starting point is that Congress sought fairness, 
not reasonableness,223 in fee contracts.224 Congress intended the 
fiduciary duty to furnish a “mechanism by which the fairness of 
management contracts could be tested in court.”225 
Arm’s-length bargaining is a proxy for fairness because it 
precludes self-dealing. But Congress recognized that arm’s-length 
bargaining does not occur in the mutual fund industry over fees. A 
Senate report stated that “[t]he forces of arm’s-length bargaining do 
not work in the mutual fund industry in the same manner as they do 
in other sectors of the American economy.”226 A House report echoes 
that sentiment: “[N]egotiations between the unaffiliated directors and 
fund advisers over advisory fees would lack an essential element of 
arm’s-length bargaining—the freedom to terminate the negotiations 
 
 220. Professor Freeman focuses on courts’, not boards’, recognition of comparables’ power, 
and maintains that when investment advisors treat a third-party more favorably than their retail 
clients, that difference should be prima facie evidence of a breach of fiduciary duty. Freeman et 
al., supra note 17, at 144. This Note’s “strongly indicative” standard engages both boards and 
courts to broaden the narrative development of the fiduciary standard. It also allows for the 
investment advisor to offer a legitimate basis for a larger profit spread. 
 221. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 222. See Rogers & Benedict, supra note 41, at 1084 (“[T]he Commission and the industry 
never did concur on what the term ‘fiduciary duty’ meant in this context.”). 
 223. See id. at 1082–89 (describing Congress’s rejection of the reasonableness standard and 
the legislative compromise that followed). 
 224. The industry would likely agree with the fairness standard. See Coates & Hubbard, 
supra note 12, at 204 (“Absent a clear statute, courts fall back on the common law, and absent 
the presumption of the business judgment rule, that standard would ordinarily be a ‘fairness’ 
standard.”). 
 225. S. Rep. No. 91-184, at 5 (1969). 
 226. Id. 
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and to bargain with other parties for the same services.”227 Because 
Congress recognized the industry’s lack of arm’s-length negotiations 
but expected fairness anyway, it is reasonable for courts to compare 
fees negotiated in arm’s-length contracts to those in mutual fund 
contracts. This comparison would incorporate bargained-for, market-
set fees into the fiduciary duty standard without relying on the 
inefficient mutual fund market as Harris Associates demands. 
The most natural comparison is to the fees that noncaptive, 
institutional investors, like pension funds, pay.228 The investment 
advisor performs a substantially similar job—investing pools of 
money—for both clients, but the money has different owners (either 
retail investors or institutional investors). The difference in the fee-
setting process between mutual funds and their investment advisor 
and pension funds and their investment advisor is that pension fund 
contracts are negotiated at arm’s length, whereas boards appointed by 
the investment advisor approve the contract for mutual funds.229 
The mutual fund fee negotiation more closely resembles self-
dealing than arm’s-length bargaining because the investment advisor 
sits on both sides of the deal: the investment advisor is the seller and 
the mutual fund’s board, appointed by the investment advisor, is the 
buyer. This has a significant impact on the level of fees charged to the 
investor. A 2001 study found that mutual funds paid double the 
advisory fee that pension funds paid to investment advisors, fifty-six 
basis points rather than twenty-eight basis points, even though mutual 
funds are on average three times larger than pension funds.230 That 
translates to managers being paid an average of $1.2 million to 
manage an institutional fund’s money and $7.38 million (over six 
times greater) to manage a mutual fund’s money.231 This difference 
hardly conforms to Congress’s goal of fairness. 
Fairness does not necessarily mean that retail investors and 
institutional investors should be charged the same fees. Actual 
 
 227. H.R. Rep. No. 89-2337, at 131 (1966), available at http://sechistorical.org/collection/ 
papers/1960/1966_InvestCoGrowth/CH3D.PDF. 
 228. The Eighth Circuit ruled on April 8, 2009, that the district court erred when it rejected 
a comparison between fees paid by institutional and mutual fund clients. Gallus v. Ameriprise 
Fin., Inc., 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 7382 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 229. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 537 F.3d 728, 731–32 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc) (quoting Freeman & Brown, supra note 33, at 634). 
 230. Freeman & Brown, supra note 33, at 631. One would expect the larger funds to pay 
smaller fees, as a percentage of assets under management, due to economies of scale. 
 231. Id. 
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administrative cost differences should be passed through to mutual 
fund shareholders; wider profit margins accruing to an investment 
advisor from its mutual funds compared to its institutional funds, 
however, should trigger a rebuttable presumption of a breach of 
fiduciary duty. 
No well-known cost differences between managing money 
owned by retail investors and managing that owned by institutional 
investors exist,232 but retail investors may produce additional 
administrative costs.233 If retail investors actually create additional 
administrative costs, investment advisors should be able to pass those 
costs on to retail investors. These pass-through costs are costs that the 
fund would not incur but for the retail clients. The variable costs and 
fixed costs investment advisors incur would be distributed among the 
investors in the fund family. Each investor would be responsible for 
its pro-rata share of fixed costs, and retail investors would bear any 
additional variable costs they create. If, after allocating the 
appropriate pass-through costs to retail investors, any difference 
remains between the fee paid by the retail funds and the fee paid by 
the institutional client, this difference is additional profit for the 
investment advisor. 
Legitimate reasons may exist for a larger profit spread,234 but the 
burden should be on advisors to prove that their services are worth 
more to one type of client than another. Boards and courts should 
regard discrepancies between institutional client fees and mutual fund 
fees in excess of the pass-through costs as indicative of a breach of 
fiduciary duty. Broadening the comparison to fees negotiated by 
institutional clients while permitting investment advisors to pass 
additional administrative costs to retail investors allows both boards 
and courts to protect shareholders from excessive fees, as Congress 
intended. 
In practice, for boards to compare their mutual fund’s fee to the 
investment advisor’s institutional clients’ fees, the advisor would have 
 
 232. Id. at 634. 
 233. Chief Judge Easterbrook suggested reasons why retail investors may be charged more. 
Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 634–35 (7th Cir. 2008). Judge Posner noted that “[t]he 
panel opinion throws out some suggestions on why this difference may be justified, but the 
suggestions are offered purely as speculation, rather than anything having an evidentiary or 
empirical basis.” Harris Assocs., 537 F.3d at 731 (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing 
en banc). 
 234. For example, it may require more skill to manage the liquidity needs of a retail fund, 
thus warranting higher profit. 
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to disclose clearly delineated fees, and report fees and expenses 
independently from one another.235 Both researchers who criticize and 
who support the industry have identified commingling fees and 
expenses as a problem.236 Because a discrepancy between retail and 
institutional funds should strongly indicate a breach, boards would be 
forced to demand that funds justify additional cost.237 If boards did 
not, they would be shirking their responsibility to shareholders.238 
Even if boards were satisfied that additional costs were warranted, 
under this standard, courts could still find that the investment advisor 
breached its duty to shareholders. Section 36(b) does not give the 
board’s decision conclusive weight, but only such consideration as is 
appropriate in all circumstances.239 This provision of the statute 
ensures that a completely independent body can review the 
transaction for fairness if the shareholders demand review by suing. 
Pass-through costs are likely to foster creative accounting as 
funds designate costs as either variable or fixed. This problem raises 
the question of who will police the pass-through costs. The SEC 
should require that the pass-through cost be a reportable number, 
subject to audit. The board would therefore not be responsible for 
determining which costs should be considered variable or fixed. But 
the board would be responsible for approving the level of variable 
costs the investment advisor was passing through to the shareholders 
as a part of the yearly 15(c) contract review.240 
Broadening Gartenberg’s comparative fee structure factor to 
include a comparison between the fees paid by mutual funds and 
institutional investors would introduce arm’s-length bargaining, a 
proxy for fairness, into mutual fund excessive-fee cases. By allowing 
 
 235. See Freeman & Brown, supra note 33, at 669 (proposing a uniform, clearly delineated 
system of expense reporting). 
 236. See Coates & Hubbard, supra note 12, at 187–88 (“Data are not readily available to 
accurately isolate the pure costs of portfolio management . . . .”); Freeman et al., supra note 17, 
at 109 (“[I]t is undoubtedly correct that a minor amount of commingling of expense items 
sometimes exists and—quite regrettably—frustrates perfect apples-to-apples comparisons on a 
universal basis.”). 
 237. This will require that investment advisors disclose these fees to the boards as part of the 
yearly 15(c) contract approval process. 
 238. Boards do not have a fiduciary duty to shareholders under Section 36(b), but they are 
accountable to shareholders through state law. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 
(Del. 1985) (“Under Delaware law . . . the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are 
managed by or under its board of directors. . . . [D]irectors are charged with an unyielding 
fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders.”). 
 239. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 240. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2006). 
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mutual fund investors the benefit of profit spreads negotiated at arm’s 
length and simultaneously preserving compensation for any real 
differences that exist in administrative costs, the pricing structure this 
Note suggests fulfills Congress’s intent that mutual fund investors be 
charged fair fees. This revised interpretation of Gartenberg’s fifth 
factor would become part of the narrative that boards and investment 
advisors consider when performing their duties owed to shareholders. 
It would become the norm for investment advisors to provide boards 
with information regarding the level of fees charged to institutional 
clients and for boards to compare that information to the level of fees 
charged to their mutual fund clients. Both boards and courts would 
routinely review any identified discrepancies. 
B. Eliminate the Profitability Factor 
Investment advisors are money managers, not volunteers. They 
are, and should be, working for a profit. Section 36(b) does not 
require that the investment advisor charge the lowest possible fee, 
only a fair fee. If an investment advisor can make a relatively high 
profit without inflating fees, the advisor should not be punished with 
a strike against it in a Gartenberg proceeding. Consider an investment 
advisor over two years. In the first year, the advisor charged a 
management fee of seventy-five basis points, of which fifty basis 
points were profit and twenty-five basis points covered costs of the 
advisor. In the second year, the advisor charged the same fee but 
made sixty basis points of profit because the advisor drove down costs 
to fifteen basis points. This change did not affect investors because 
they paid the same level of fees regardless of the manager’s profit 
margin. Investment advisors would be incentivized to drive down 
costs because cost savings would accrue to their profit spread, 
whereas investors would continue to pay the same amount. This 
approach encourages efficiency in the industry without a negative 
effect on the investor’s bottom line. 
Advisors could conceivably pass on the cost savings in the form 
of lower fees in two ways. First, an investment advisor could 
determine that, to attract new customers, it will lower its fee.241 The 
investment advisor would still be making a comfortable profit while 
passing savings on to investors. Next, institutional clients could begin 
to demand that they also benefit from these savings, so mutual funds 
 
 241. This assumes investment advisors believe that investors will become or are already 
sensitive to fees when selecting a fund. 
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would benefit because of the broadened comparative fee analysis Part 
IV.A.1 suggests. 
Retail investors and institutional investors are unlikely to realize 
these savings if Gartenberg continues to require courts and boards to 
consider profitability. The profitability factor removes incentives 
from advisors to lower costs; if the cost savings increase advisors’ 
profits, the board could take that profit away in the next fee 
negotiation or courts could mark a strike against them in a traditional 
Gartenberg analysis. Investment advisors do not have a reward to 
correspond to the risk they take by lowering fees. The mutual fund 
industry should reward, not punish, efficiency when possible. 
Eliminating the profitability factor would take a step in that direction. 
CONCLUSION 
Two thousand eight was a trying year for most investors: home 
values fell and portfolios plummeted.242 In the months following Chief 
Judge Easterbrook’s decision in Jones v. Harris Associates, the credit 
crisis cost investors trillions243 and frauds like the Madoff Ponzi 
scheme244 contributed to a decline in confidence in the markets. In 
hindsight, it was a tough year to argue for less shareholder protection. 
But that is just what the Harris Associates majority did. The Seventh 
Circuit broke with a thirty-year-old precedent, Gartenberg, under 
which a plaintiff had never prevailed in court, to eviscerate any 
remaining protection shareholders had under the fiduciary duty in 
Section 36(b). 
To meaningfully assert the protection Congress intended for 
shareholders, this Note proposes modifying the fifth Gartenberg 
factor, comparative fee structures, to include a comparison between 
retail fund fees and institutional fees. This change would broaden the 
fiduciary analysis under Gartenberg while maintaining the narrative 
structure that courts and boards have already developed. 
Additionally, eliminating the profitability factor would incentivize 
 
 242. Year-End Review of Markets & Finance 2008 – SOS: ‘Save Our Stocks’ – A Look Back 
at a Year of Bailouts, Underwater Investors and Sunken Hopes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2009, at R9. 
 243. Timothy R. Homan, IMF Says Losses from Crisis May Hit $4.1 Trillion, BLOOMBERG, 
Apr. 21, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=azkSmZrrIHKQ. 
 244. See generally Con of the Century, ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 2008, at 119 (describing the 
Madoff scandal and estimating a $50 billion cost to investors); Evan Perez and Steve Stecklow, 
Stanford Is Indicted in Fraud, Surrenders, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2009, at C1 (reporting Allen 
Stanford’s indictment for fraud). 
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investment advisors to reduce fees by allowing them to reap the 
rewards of those fee reductions. The Court should resist Chief Judge 
Easterbrook’s new standard because, although a fiduciary duty may 
no longer be the “punctilio of an honor”245 it once was, it is more than 
a prohibition against fraud and secrecy. 
 
 245. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
